Although considerable effort and expense have been put forth in an effort to control food and/or airborne pathogenic microorganisms, there nevertheless exist significant safety problems in the supply of packaged food, in the certification of sterility for medically useful components, e.g. surgical tools, internal examination devices, e.g. endoscopes, and the like, and in dealing with the use of a variety of biological materials as weapons of mass destruction.
For example, numerous outbreaks of food poisoning brought about by foodstuffs contaminated with strains of the E. coli, Campylobacter, Listeria, Cyclospora and Salmonella microorganisms have caused illness and even death, not to mention a tremendous loss of revenue for food producers. These and other microorganisms can inadvertently taint food, even when reasonably careful food handling procedures are followed. The possibility of accidental contamination, for example by temperature abuse, in and of itself, is enough to warrant incorporation of safe and effective biological material diagnosis and detection procedures. Further complicating the situation is the very real possibility that a terrorist organization might target either the food or water supply of a municipality or even a nation itself, by attempting to include a pathogenic microorganism or toxic contaminant capable of causing widespread illness or even death. If, by accident or design, the food supply of a particular population were to be contaminated, it is not only imperative that the population be alerted to the contamination, but it is further necessary that the particular contaminant be quickly and precisely pinpointed so that appropriate countermeasures may be taken.
With respect to medical or dental procedures, there exists a very real possibility for transmission of disease due to ineffective sterilization techniques or careless handling of medical implements, which can often lead to contamination of the sterile field. Although these devices are generally wrapped after sterilization, it is impossible to verify the efficacy of the sterilizing process or determine if subsequent contamination has occurred prior to use.
Additional attention is directed toward the use of potential agents of bioterrorism, e.g. various bacteria, viruses, or toxins, which can be of microbial, plant, or animal origin, also represent a credible threat to the general population, since they can be incorporated within biological weapon systems of mass destruction. The most common agents of concern include Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Variola major virus (smallpox), and botulinum toxin. Additional potential agents include: brucella sp.; Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus and other viral encephalidities; Vibrio cholerae (cholera); and, staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB).
The technology required to creates weapons of mass destruction from biological agents is readily available to the civilian population in the form of texts and information available via the Internet. Modestly financed organizations of relatively small size and rather basic training in biology and engineering could easily develop an effective biological weapons capability.
Individual agents and toxins useful as biological weapons generally share the following features: (1) capability of being dispersed as aerosols and remain suspended for hours; (2) aerosols are deliverable by simple technology readily available in industry, e.g., agricultural crop dusters, backpack sprayers, purse-size perfume atomizers, and the like; and, (3) aerosols are capable of producing significant, if not fatal, illness in humans when inhaled.
In contrast to screening methods used to detect traditional explosive devices (e.g., x-ray and trained canines), there are essentially no routine methods or technology in place to detect a biological weapon. Additionally, variously known laboratory techniques for detecting biological agents require extensive time for development and testing of sample cultures in order to confirm a diagnosis.
Lastly, it is generally accepted that it is impossible to know either the timing for release of a biological agent or the methodology of its dispersal, e.g. aerosol, powder, via the mails, through HVAC systems, or the like.
Thus, it is imperative that articles of manufacture be developed which provide an unambiguous warning to the untrained general population, that they have come in contact with a biological weapon.